Accounting for Accountability by Su, Celina
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works




City University of New York
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_pubs
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications and Research by an authorized
administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact AcademicWorks@gc.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Su, Celina, "Accounting for Accountability" (2014). CUNY Academic Works.
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_pubs/125
Book Review 1
Celina Su is associate professor of 
political science at Brooklyn College, City 
University of New York. Her publications 
include Streetwise for Book Smarts: 
Grassroots Organizing and Education 
Reform in the Bronx (Cornell University 
Press, 2009), Our Schools Suck: Young 
People Talk Back to a Segregated 
Nation on the Failures of Urban 
Education (coauthored, New York 
University Press, 2009), and Introducing 
Global Health: Practice, Policy, and 
Solutions (coauthored, Jossey-Bass, 2013). 
Her honors include a Berlin Prize. She has 
served on New York City’s participatory 




Public Administration Review, 
Vol. xx, Iss. xx, pp. xx–xx. © 2014 by 
The American Society for Public Administration. 
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12220.
of Transparency, Participation, and Accountability, 
edited by Sanjeev Khagram, Archon Fung, and Paolo 
de Renzio, goes a long way toward ﬁ lling this gap and 
remedying the situation.
Th e book aims to answer three key questions: the ﬁ rst 
concerns the emergence and sustainability of ﬁ scal 
transparency and participation, the second explores 
which conditions and mechanisms lead to greater 
government responsiveness (including outcomes such 
as reduced corruption and better budget allocations), 
and the third asks whether greater transparency leads 
to greater participation. Th e book provides a frame-
work for analysis; a cogent summary of the relevant 
(and admittedly limited) theoretical and empirical 
literature on ﬁ scal transparency, participation, and 
accountability; and highlights eight country-level 
case studies. Th ese studies draw on data from the 
Open Budget Index (OBI), a biannual eﬀ ort by the 
International Budget Partnership to assess budget 
transparency across nations. Th e OBI assesses coun-
tries’ availability and comprehensiveness of eight key 
documents, including a pre-budget statement that 
presents key assumptions (such as overall economic 
forecasts, especially important in countries that rely 
on volatile commodities such as crude oil), an audit 
report, and a citizens’ budget that minimizes technical 
language.
Th e introductory chapter does a commendable job of 
summarizing the relevant literatures. For example, the 
editors emphasize the extent to which transparency 
laws are not properly implemented and the extent 
to which transparency does not beget participation 
or accountability. Th e latter depend much more on 
oppositional political parties, civil society organiza-
tions, and popular media. It makes sense, then, 
that critical gaps in international standards concern 
legislative oversight of executive budgets and popular 
participation by civil society organizations and eve-
ryday citizens. How can governments ensure that the 
public successfully accesses and uses data thoughtfully 
and strategically?
Sanjeev Khagram, Archon Fung, and Paolo de Renzio, 
eds., Open Budgets: Th e Political Economy of 
Transparency, Participation, and Accountability 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 
264 pp. $29.95 (paper), ISBN: 9780815723370.
In December 2013, the White House announced its second-ever Open Government National Action Plan. Th e ﬁ ve highlighted areas for 
action included improvements to the Freedom of 
Information Act, petitioning platforms, and greater 
data availability. Th e remaining two highlighted areas 
dealt with ﬁ nancial accountability, more speciﬁ -
cally, membership in the Global Initiative for Fiscal 
Transparency (GIFT; see http://ﬁ scaltransparency.
net), and participatory budgeting, which the Barack 
Obama administration deﬁ ned as “giving citizens 
a voice in how taxpayer dollars are spent in their 
communities.”1
In many ways, this plan for “open government” 
responds to mounting criticism regarding President 
Obama’s surveillance policies and attempts to counter 
the dysfunction associated with ﬁ scal impasses and 
budget shutdowns. Such a dose of transparency 
could bolster the American government’s credibility. 
Strikingly, the plan follows models set by middle-
income countries rather than establishing the United 
States as the vanguard in innovative administrative 
policies. GIFT is partly led by the Brazilian Ministry 
of Planning and the Department of Budget and 
Management of the Philippines; participatory budget-
ing started more than two decades ago in Brazil. Th at 
the White House has announced these programs 
nationally, then, reﬂ ects just how mainstream and 
essential to legitimacy such open government policies 
have become.
Given the simultaneous (and certainly not coinciden-
tal) proliferation of ﬁ nancial crises and ﬁ scal trans-
parency projects around the world, there have been 
surprisingly few policy-oriented, comparative studies 
of public budgets. Open Budgets: Th e Political Economy 
Accounting for Accountability
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groups. Because the South African constitution lists 
social and economic rights alongside civil ones, civil 
society organizations have generated analyses prov-
ing, in court, that greater health funds (particularly 
for antiretroviral treatment) and school funds must be 
distributed to render rights to health and education 
meaningful.
Nevertheless, Friedman argues that the country’s 
reforms emphasized transparency in form rather than 
in substance and, in some ways, ensured that the citi-
zenry was not empowered in the process. Oppositional 
political parties, often the political actors who point 
out malfeasance in the government, were not strong 
enough to do so. Civil society organizations, espe-
cially those that represented the least powerful—the 
unemployed or those working in informal sectors and 
outside of labor unions—did not possess the exper-
tise to challenge the ANC. Th e other key potential 
actor, the popular media, has not managed to foster 
constructive debate because copious technical data are 
not translated for lay readers, and the government’s 
dissemination strategies remain limited. Th us, these 
transparency laws are still largely administrative tools 
rather than levers for democracy.
In Brazil’s case, presented by Jorge Antonio Alves 
and Patrick Heller, ﬁ scal transparency is especially 
important because Brazil’s public sector is unusually 
large and because it has assumed increasing signiﬁ -
cance with social welfare initiatives since democratiza-
tion. Th e government regularly releases a vast array 
of disaggregated data shortly after disbursement. Th is 
means that civil society organizations and everyday 
citizens can actually engage with the data and easily 
report errors, and there exists participation as well as 
transparency.
Despite these signiﬁ cant successes, Brazil’s outcomes 
are mixed beneath the surface. Because many budget 
allocations are automatic, there is little room for ﬂ ex-
ibility and negotiation. Th is means that discretionary 
funds are prone to pork barrel politics, and execu-
tive politicians use disbursement authorization as a 
bargaining chip in times of ﬁ scal austerity. Politicians 
work within the system to meet and “ﬁ x” outcomes—
for instance, by artiﬁ cially lowering projected growth 
during the year to make sure they meet their budgets 
and then regularly giving out “Christmas bonuses” at 
year’s end. While the transparency initiatives have not 
dramatically lowered corruption, they have made it 
more obvious.
Th e chapter provides a good overview of how democ-
ratization and macroeconomic stabilization together 
helped bring about the three milestone foundations 
in Brazilian budget transparency: the 1988 Citizen 
Constitution, the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law, and 
the 2009 Transparency Law. Th e 2000 law forced state 
Partly because of the subject matter’s complexity 
and the diversity of the case studies, the introduc-
tion provides an analytical framework rather than a 
set of conclusive ﬁ ndings. For instance, most of the 
associations—such as decentralization—depend on 
other contextual factors. Th e direction of causality 
also remains elusive. Countries with higher per capita 
incomes tend to be more transparent, but is that 
because they have built the capacity to administer 
taxes and budget allocations eﬃ  ciently, with well-
trained staﬀ  and a professionalized bureaucracy, or the 
other way around? Many countries with large endow-
ments of natural resources suﬀ er from a “resource 
curse,” corrupt governments, and steep inequalities. 
What accounts for the exceptions to the rule? Th e in-
depth country case studies begin to provide answers 
by examining the combinations and sequencing of 
factors. Th ey are presented in descending order, from 
those with the highest OBI score to those with the 
lowest: South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, 
Guatemala, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Senegal.
While each of these chapters does a solid job of simul-
taneously arguing a defensible thesis and presenting 
an overview of the country’s relevant recent history 
and political economy, the cases at the beginning 
and end of the spectrum are the most startling and 
interesting. Th is is partly because they deal less with 
administrative capacity and pervasive, almost depress-
ingly predictable cases of corruption and more with 
how speciﬁ c governments belied expectations and 
either made use of political crises or failed to mean-
ingfully implement well-intentioned laws. Th us, this 
review gives more room to the chapters on South 
Africa, Brazil, South Korea, and Senegal.
As Steven Friedman states, South Africa’s success 
is counterintuitive because its budget transparency 
came not from “public pressure but from its insula-
tion” (51). Th e African National Congress (ANC) 
has controlled the government since the country’s 
 democratization in 1994. Th e ANC has thus been 
able to enact transparency laws in its reformist zeal, 
but, “[i]ronically, one consequence of majority rule 
was a government elected in the main by poor black 
people that was obsessed with demonstrating its com-
petence to the advantaged minority,” the white elites 
who remain economically advantaged (59).
Between public protests in low-income black town-
ships and payment boycotts among white suburban-
ites, all decrying government waste and corruption, 
“there is . . . no lack of interest in budgetary issues” 
in South Africa (67). Th e treasury has been able to 
assert the importance of transparency in at least partly 
resisting patronage politics. Businesses have been able 
to make use of public data to assess ﬁ nancial risk, 
and major trade unions have used data to propose 
alternative budgets that better serve high-need 
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as preeminent regarding public access and use of tech-
nology is also reﬂ ected here; of the case studies in the 
book, South Korea seems to be the only one that can 
claim that its digital information system (D-Brain), 
developed in 2004, allows the public access with ease.
Participation by South Korean budget experts and 
civil society organizations appears to have been essen-
tial. Groups such as Citizens Against Budget Waste 
provided classes on budget literacy to average citizens, 
and they were generally well organized and nonparti-
san. Th e consequent data made a diﬀ erence in debates 
on the national debt, debt ceiling, and tax cuts. When 
welfare policies expanded, the ultimate trifecta of a 
top-down system with a competent bureaucracy, a 
National Fiscal Management Plan that people trusted, 
and active vetting and participation by civil society 
groups and everyday citizens allowed for rapid dis-
bursement of public funds.
A set of common themes emerge from the “middle 
of the spectrum” (the Mexico, Guatemala, Tanzania, 
and Vietnam case studies). Citizens are either turned 
oﬀ  or intimidated enough to not participate, all but 
eliminating meaningful government accountability 
to the public. Even where budget transparency laws 
exist, the oﬀ -limits parts of the budgets become 
veritable “black holes,” so that exceptions to open 
budgets become the rule. Th ere are not enough details 
or sensitivity analyses in national budgets to compare 
them to previous years, to be sure of their accuracy or 
means of composition, or to gauge their performance. 
No real consequences follow poor performance, and 
social actors are not partners in oversight. Popular 
media is too concentrated to provoke debate. In 
Mexico, for instance, there are just two major televi-
sion companies.
Th e chapter on Guatemala is especially helpful in 
highlighting the long-term institutional traumas 
of war, describing a context in which even political 
parties remain ephemeral and showing how ideologi-
cal polarization can be helpful, at least, in prompting 
political actors to articulate clear positions in budget 
debates. A helpful chart (167) summarizes how leg-
islators can short-circuit laws by restoring loopholes 
right after they pass. Th e Tanzanian and Vietnamese 
cases are fascinating because reforms, as limited as 
they are, came without accompanying democrati-
zation. In some ways, combating corruption and 
economic growth are higher priorities than democra-
tization and transparency in those contexts, especially 
when even oversight institutions do not necessarily 
receive accurate data.
Th ese chapters also show that progress can be made 
incrementally and that imperfect transparency 
reforms remain better than none at all. In Mexico, 
requests for information skyrocketed after an access 
governments to document their ballooning debts and 
to abide by budget guidelines (so that, for instance, 
they did not spend more during election years and 
leave the mess for their successors). But civil society 
organizations felt that their input was not seriously 
considered; for example, they were not given pass-
words to access government data. A series of political 
scandals in 2009 presented a window of opportunity 
for new mandates. Th e 2009 law allows the federal 
government to freeze transfers if budgets are not 
revealed in “real time.” Executives must now also 
disclose daily revenues and line items, including who 
got paid how much and what services were rendered, 
in “transparency portals.”
Another notable aspect of the Brazilian experience is 
that of coordinated decentralization, well documented 
in studies on both participatory budgeting and health 
councils. In particular, local executives are incentiv-
ized to properly disseminate budget data because the 
health councils can deny them federal resources if they 
do not do so.
Th e South Korean case, authored by Jong-sung You 
and Wonhee Lee, feels similar to the Brazilian one in 
that many transparency laws were ﬁ rst passed during 
democratization, and newer mandates strengthened 
implementation considerably following more recent 
scandals. In this case, the “IMF-plus” reforms after 
the 1997 Asian ﬁ nancial crisis and “Th ree Plus One” 
reforms (performance goals and indicators, an infor-
mation technology system, and sectoral budget ceil-
ings, coordinated through a ﬁ ve-year plan) from 2003 
to 2007 greatly improved the eﬃ  ciency of the budget 
process. Th ey also provided protection for whistle-
blowers and incentive programs to report public 
waste, reduced the reach of powerful chaebol private 
sector conglomerates, and established new agencies for 
eﬀ ective checks and balances.
As with the other countries in this book, there are lim-
itations to South Korea’s transparency. Extrabudgetary 
special funds, “sacred territories,” “national security 
costs,” and transfers between the federal and local 
governments are either oﬀ  limits or diﬃ  cult to track. 
More remarkable are the country’s successes. Not just 
budgets, but also many budget meetings, are open 
to the public. Th ere is strong oversight by an inde-
pendent audit institution with more than 900 staﬀ , 
including certiﬁ ed accountants and lawyers, with real 
powers regarding disciplinary actions. As of 2010, 
more than one-third of municipalities had imple-
mented participatory budgeting. It really appears as if 
institutional cultures have changed: potentially dubi-
ous “public interest corporation contracts” declined 
from 58 percent in 1985 to 7.7 percent in 1997 in the 
central government, and the percentage of reported 
bribes of public oﬃ  cials decreased from 25 percent in 
2000 to 5 percent in 2008. Th e country’s reputation 
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patterns and propose alternative budgets. Th e popular 
media has to be free and well informed enough to 
disseminate these debates widely. And data cannot be 
restricted to the national level, as capacity issues and 
political appointments tend to proliferate at the local 
levels, particularly in poorer regions. Further analyses 
would be helpful, especially on how central govern-
ments help diﬀ use best practices among localities and 
manage local governments that refuse to cooperate 
either because they are controlled by oppositional par-
ties or corrupt oﬃ  cials.
I wish that the editors had provided a concluding 
chapter (one that builds on the details elucidated in 
the in-depth case studies) and imposed a bit more of 
a comparative framework on the case study chapters. 
While I appreciated the wide range of factors exam-
ined in the eight case study chapters, ideally, a series of 
tables would summarize which factors were compa-
rable and which factors were not. Given the topics at 
hand—public access to information and what it takes 
to make the information legible to everyday citizens, 
not just technocrats, bureaucrats, and experts—I also 
longed for more invitations to engage with the data 
so as to better understand patterns through interac-
tive platforms. To what extent did the broad correlates 
mentioned in the introductory chapter apply in each 
case? What were the main permutations of each cor-
relate? What helped to explain the exceptions?
Moreover, viewing the answers for the eight case stud-
ies together would help readers glean a slightly more 
nuanced, balanced understanding than that provided 
in the introduction alone, while helping readers keep 
the big picture in mind. Just as the last chapter was 
especially elucidating because it contrasts Senegal with 
Mali and Burkina Faso in its analysis, it would have 
been helpful to contrast each country, however brieﬂ y, 
with one or two similar countries to better illustrate 
what programs and policies seem reasonable for their 
governments to undertake. Th e Mexico chapter men-
tions the potential use of a central agency like that 
in Ecuador or Taiwan, for example, but it does not 
describe what that would look like. I also wish that 
the editors had included one Global North country, 
such as the United States (with a recent OBI score in 
the upper 70s) to serve as a point of reference and to 
help readers contextualize these readings (and encour-
age course adoption).
Last but not least, a critical examination of the OBI 
itself would be helpful. Th e entire book builds on the 
OBI data set, which facilitates comparative analysis. 
But what are the broader assumptions embedded in 
the OBI formulation and criteria? A theme from the 
participatory budgeting literature, for instance, is 
that as that process becomes widespread, many of the 
original goals of social justice, equity, and redistribu-
tion have become subservient to declared missions of 
law went into eﬀ ect in 2003. In Tanzania, the ruling 
political party remains hegemonic, but internal rifts 
have prompted politicians within the party to keep 
each other accountable. Even without penalty pow-
ers and full autonomy, Vietnam’s audit agency and 
national assembly bring attention to budget priorities 
and deliberation, inviting public scrutiny.
Th e last chapter, by Linda Beck, E. H. Seydou 
Nourou Toure, and Aliou Faye, on Senegal’s eﬀ orts 
at transparency reform, renders explicit many of the 
comparisons readers may implicitly make between 
chapters (say, between the Mexican and Guatemalan 
cases, with similar OBI scores but diﬀ erent historical 
contexts and party politics scenarios). For instance, 
the authors state that, on average, Anglophone 
African countries tend to do better than Francophone 
ones, and Senegal is just one of ﬁ ve former French 
colonies with a score of 5 or lower on the 2010 OBI. 
Yet, they argue, this is less a reﬂ ection of colonial 
legacy than the current context. Th e legislature and 
audit institutions are weak, lacking the capacity to 
hold the executive branch accountable. Although 
some budget transparency measures were enacted as 
part of their structural adjustment programs with 
international donors, these measures were made 
absent suﬃ  cient consultation with the general public. 
Further, in a context of hyperpresidentialism and 
one dominant political party, international donor 
pressure to enhance legislative participation in the 
budget process does not give due consideration to the 
political constraints that will continue to limit their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Low literacy 
rates (even among members of parliament) also mean 
that detailed documents are meaningless to most 
Senegalese without an accompanying citizens’ budget. 
Donors, in some ways, are more focused on their own 
access to reliable numbers than on expanding the pub-
lic’s access. To address such issues, donors can build 
capacity among civil society organizations to provide 
independent analyses and monitoring and encourage 
public participation alongside transparency.
Th e case studies are especially strong in showing 
how policy entrepreneurs (presidents, political par-
ties, international donors, and others—including 
determined ordinary citizens) can use a large-scale, 
especially atrocious corruption scandal as a window 
of opportunity to push through ﬁ scal transparency 
reforms. Although the private sector often opposes 
the expansion of government regulations or powers, 
ﬁ scal transparency beneﬁ ts the private sector because 
it facilitates higher-grade investments.
Such transparency laws, however, mean little without 
a forceful and robust civil society. Budgetary informa-
tion must be disaggregated and relatively timely to be 
meaningful and to allow academics and civil society 
organizations to point out inequitable or suspicious 
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Th e chapters are clearly written, and the conceptual 
framework is thoughtful and lucid. Ultimately, the 
book emphasizes the complexity of ensuring that 
budget transparency is not just another public sector 
management technique, a trendy technocratic tool for 
“good governance” (that can then ultimately reify a 
neoliberal agenda), but a truly empowering principle, 
one that should ultimately enable citizens to make 
governments more responsive to their grievances and 
needs.
Note
1. See the White House press release on “Transparency and Open 
Government” at http://1.usa.gov/1dLtUiU (accessed March 
17, 2014).
governmental transparency. Is there something similar 
happening with open budgets overall?
Still, these are small quibbles regarding an otherwise 
strong work, and a timely one at that. Th e book com-
plements the quickly growing literature on participa-
tory budgeting and on implementation at the local 
level. With new participating governments, such as 
the American presidential administration, every year, 
the literature will continue to grow. Th e book would 
best serve students in master’s-level public administra-
tion, public policy, planning, or politics programs. 
However, it would also serve well in political science, 
civic engagement, and area studies classes, and it is 
accessible to more advanced undergraduate students. 
